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SYMPOSIUM REMARKS: CHANGING THE
FACE OF IMMIGRATION: A YEAR IN
TRANSITION
MARSHALL FITZ*

Good Morning. It is a pleasure to be sitting on a panel with
these distinguished colleagues and I thank Peter for the
invitation and I particularly want to commend Victor Cerda for
attending the session. I believe it is really important for
Department of Homeland Security (hereinafter "DHS") officials
to be out here in a forum like this discussing the difficult issues
that confront the department as it struggles with its daunting
mandate and organizational challenges. I also want to thank
Victor for nicely prefacing some of my comments, although I will
have to take issue with some of his optimism about the direction
of DHS.
I have been asked to take a slightly different angle on today's
topic and talk a bit about the broader impact that the migration
of INS from the Department of Justice (hereinafter "DOJ") to
DHS has had on policy level advocacy. I plan to highlight what I
will loosely term structural obstacles that the reorganization has
created or exacerbated for immigration advocates, as well as
something I will call ambient impediments to effective advocacy
in the new regime.
Throughout the negotiations surrounding the development of
the Homeland Security Act,, the American Immigration Lawyers
Association (hereinafter "AILA") maintained that an effective
reform or reorganization would need to adhere to the following
structural prescriptions: strong coordination between separated
service and enforcement functions, a single leader at the helm of
These remarks are an actual transcript of the author's comments at the St. John's
Journal of Legal Commentary Symposium on Feb. 27, 2004.
1 Homeland Security Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-296, 116 Stat. 2135 (2002)
(establishing the Department of Homeland Security).
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the agency with the authority to develop and administer policy
for all of the immigration functions, and adequate funding for
immigration services. Unfortunately, in our view, the
reorganization of our immigration functions in DHS fall short on
each of the following criteria: the structure for coordinating
services and enforcement is wholly inadequate; no one person is
charged with policy development; and the immigration services
component continues to lack adequate funding. In addition, the
migration of INS's immigration functions to DHS precipitated
another structural concern - the problem of concurrent
jurisdiction between DOJ and DHS.2
Let us take these structural issues in turn, starting with
coordination. Despite the clear differences that Mr. Cerda
identified, immigration enforcement and immigration services
are really just two sides of the same coin, meriting equal
attention, support, and funding. For both sides to function
efficiently and effectively, strong coordination is required.
Unfortunately, such coordination received inadequate attention
in the Homeland Security Act;3 it has not been reflected in DHS's
current practices; and it does not appear to be a priority. At a
minimum, the lack of coordination within DHS needs to be
addressed through aggressive Congressional oversight, but that
may not be enough. We believe that some formal structural
changes will need to be instituted. Advocacy efforts to correct
problems or improve services in the new agency are rendered
exceedingly difficult when the different entities within DHS
approach the same issues with different perspectives and policies
and fail to speak with a common voice.
A classic example of. this dilemma frequently emerges after
ICE places someone in immigration removal proceedings. If that
person has a petition pending with USCIS, which if approved,
would permit the immigration judge to accord the person
permanent resident status, ICE is not bound to, and typically
2 See generally Catherine Etheridge Otto, Tracking Immigrants in the United States:
Proposed and Perceived Needs to Protect the Borders of the United States, 28 N.C. J. INT'L
L. & COM. REG. 477, 486 (2002) (discussing intersection of DOH and immigration
services).
3 See Elizabeth Keyes, Developments in the Executive Branch: Transitionfrom INS to
Department of Homeland Security: Authority of the Secretary of Homeland Security,
Delegations of Authority, and Immigration Laws, 17 GEO. IMMIGR. L.J. 509, 510 (2003)
(relating transition of immigration services from INS to DHS).
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will refuse to terminate the proceedings or close the proceedings
pending the adjudication of that petition. 4 USCIS, for its part,
will not expedite the adjudication of that petition unless ICE
5
asks them to do so directly and ICE subsequently refuses.
For their part, immigration judges do have the opportunity to
stay proceedings against an individual, but they are under a lot
of pressure to reduce their case backlogs and are therefore often
reluctant to keep these cases on their dockets indefinitely. Thus,
you have a construct of partitioned responsibilities, which by its
design, limits the effectiveness of immigration advocates and
immigration practitioners to represent their clients.
Our ports of entry are another example of where services and
enforcement come together. Our national and economic security
plainly depends on the efficient flow of goods and services
through our ports. The Homeland Security Act however was
largely silent on how the immigration functions should work at
the ports of entry. 6 It is critical that those responsible for
inspections are fully trained and grasp the policies and practices
of USCIS. The current experience of AILA members, however, is
that CBP officers remain rooted in the culture of their legacy
agency, U.S. Customs, and thus accord less than adequate
attention to the immigration side of their responsibilities.
It is important to note that failures on this front are not simply
the result of legacy Customs officers resisting change and the
assumption of new responsibilities under CBP; some of the
failures are the result of specific policies that fail to recognize or
reflect the intricacies and complexity of our immigration laws.
For example, under the "One Face at the Border" initiative 7 that
effectively eliminated immigration experts from the primary
4 See generally U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services (USCIS) available at
http://uscis.gov/graphics/index.htm (last visited Apr. 18, 2004) (providing background
information on USCIS); Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) available at
http://www.ice.gov/graphics/index.htm (last visited Apr. 18, 2004) (detailing current and
archived issues within ICE).
5 See generally Jan Crawford, Justices Clip Rights of Legal Immigrants;INS Can Jail
Felons Pending Hearings on Deportation, CHI. TRIB., April 30, 2003, at C10 (citing
example of detained immigrant pending adjudication).
6 See generally Otto, supra note 2, at 501 (describing port of entry procedures under
new regulations).
7 See Press Release, Dept. of Homeland Security (Sept. 2, 2003), available at
43
5 (announcing unification functions of
http://www.dhs.gov/dhspublic/display?content=1
"One Face at the Border" initiative).
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inspection of travelers seeking entry to the U.S., no provision was
made guaranteeing the availability of an immigration specialist
to review cases even at secondary inspections.8
Let us turn to another quasi-structural issue, funding. The
immigration services functions have been chronically underfunded for as long as one can remember. 9 It is a fact that has
contributed in no small part to its deserved reputation for low
Direct Congressional
and lower quality and slow services.
appropriations are critical to supplement user fees in order to
ensure adequate delivery of services. Instead, however, the fiscal
year 2005 administration budget proposal would reduce USCIS
funding by 41%.1o These proposed cuts coincide with a proposal
by USCIS to substantially increase application and petition
fees." Processing backlogs have reached crisis proportions and
quality of service is at a historic low. I obviously do not mean to
suggest that the transition of immigration functions to DHS
caused the current funding predicament - it certainly predated
March 1st of 2003.12 But the fact that immigration services are
now buried in a massive security agency means that services
have slipped still lower on the priority totem pole and resources
and funding for these functions are going to continue to receive
short shrift. Without adequate funding, I think that all of our
calls for reform and improvement of immigration services will be
little more than empty rhetoric.
I want to turn briefly to the issue of concurrent jurisdiction.
On February 28th, 2003, in a rulemaking purporting to transfer
the immigration authorities from DOJ to DHS, the Attorney
General asserted that DOJ retains concurrent authority to
8 See Erin M. O'Callaghan, Expedited Removal and Discrimination in the Asylum
Process: The Use of HumanitarianAid as a Political Tool, 43 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1747,
1751 (2002) (explaining primary and secondary evaluations at border checkpoints).
9 See generally David Jones, Note, U.S. Immigration - A Legacy of Reform and
Reorganization: Problems and Possible Solutions, 11 FLA. J. INT'L L. 409, 411 (1997)
(noting funding problems of immigration services).
10 See Ricardo Alonso-Zaldivar, Immigration Reform Is Off Front Burner; A
Bipartisan Senate Panel Says the Bush Administration is Unwilling to Promote a Guestworker Program in an Election Year, L. A. TIMES, Mar. 24, 2004, at A14 (describing
budget cuts for USCIS in upcoming year).
11 See Betty L. Martin, Legal Residents Apply for Citizenship, HOUSTON CHRON., Aug.
28, 2003, at 1 (observing that fees for USCIS applicants have quadrupled between 1994
and 2004).
12 See Tyche Hendricks, Immigration Proposes to Raise Fees; Move Greeted by
Protests;Agency Must Cover Costs, S. F. CHRON., Feb. 4, 2004, at A7 (discussing the need
for more funding to keep the backlog from growing).
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engage in substantive rulemaking in a number of areas. 1 3 The
rationale behind this asserted authority was that the Homeland
Security Act left the immigration court system, known as the
Executive Office for Immigration Review (hereinafter "EOIR"),
housed in the DOJ.14 The implications for this assertion of
concurrent jurisdiction are considerable with the potential for
DOJ and DHS to issue conflicting regulations in a variety of
areas. The concern is that dual rulemaking authority could
precipitate cabinet-level institutional power struggles and
paralyze the government's ability to administer the immigration
laws effectively. Indeed, such a scenario is not merely theoretical
conjecture at this point, we are potentially on the cusp of such a
problem emanating from an asylum case known as Matter of RA. 15 After the case percolated up through the immigration courts,
the Attorney General certified the case to himself in order to
issue a precedent decision on whether gender can form the basis
for asylum. 16 Given the posture of the case and reports from
inside the DOJ, the decision to certify strongly suggested that the
Attorney General would reject gender as a cognizable ground for
an asylum claim. DHS, however, responded by filing a brief with
the Attorney General stating that it believes gender is an
appropriate basis for asylum and recommended against making
Matter of R-A a precedent decision.17 Instead, it argued that
forthcoming DHS policy guidelines should establish the rules for
this type of case. If the Attorney General ultimately proceeds to
13 See MIA: Terror Database,USA TODAY, Aug. 12, 2003, at 12A (pointing to ongoing
turf wars between the Department of Justice and the Department of Homeland Security).
14 See Mitch Gelman, Showcase For Our Nation's Values, NEWSDAY ( New York), Feb.
25, 1996, at A5 (mentioning that the Executive Office of Immigration Review (EOIR) in
the Department of Justice oversees the immigration court system).
15 See, e.g., Elizabeth Austin, "Asylum Decisions Can Be Life-or-Death for Refugees,"
CHICAGO LAWYER, p. 18 (Aug. 2003) (outlining case of Rodi Alvarado, a Guatemalan
woman who sought asylum in the United States from a "brutally violent husband"); Jason
Hoppin, "Seeking Shelter: Lawyer's Bid to Win Asylum Rights for Abused Women Awaits
Action by Ashcroft," THE RECORDER, Vol. 5, No. 5-2003 (May 5, 2003) (addressing
complications produced by dual involvement of DOJ and DHS). See generally Nick
Anderson, Congressional Jockeying Begins on Security Agency, SUN SENTINEL (Florida),
Jul. 11, 2002, at 5A (highlighting House Judiciary Committee wishes to have the
Department of Homeland Security enforce immigration laws while the Department of
Justice delivers immigration services).
16 See generally Alison Nuemer, Abused Women Deserve U.S. Asylum, CHI. TRIB.,
Mar. 14, 2003, at 2 (advocating that gender-based human rights abuses should serve as a
basis for asylum).
17 See generally Paul Salopek, Political Asylum; The Latest Exiles: Abused Women,
CHI. TRIB., Apr. 21, 1996, at Cl (indicating that gender-based asylum is just another bow
to political correctness).
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deny asylum in this case, concerns about a counterproductive
institutional power struggle will have materialized. So you see
the tension that this concurrent authority causes and the type of
predicaments that it can lead to.
The most complete solution to that specific structural problem
would be to reconstitute the EOIR as an independent
adjudicative body with no substantive rulemaking authority.
Unleashing it from its current moorings in the DOJ would
eliminate concerns about conflicting interagency authority and
would further other important goals.
It would provide
immigration adjudicators with the independence necessary to
conduct fair and impartial hearings which, in turn, would
significantly enhance the perceived legitimacy of immigration
court decisions. 18
My time is running short, so I want to briefly turn to some
post-transition ambient impediments to immigration related
advocacy. Specifically, I want to address an issue alluded to by
my fellow panelists concerning the predominance of the agency's
national security mission and the attendant culture of "no" that
has developed. With immigration functions now housed in DHS,
it is critically important that the new agency's policies and
practice balance national security goals with laws and policies
that welcome newcomers and recognize the strong and vital
connections that the United States has to nations around the
world.
In the post-9/11 era, national security has overshadowed all
other
policy
objectives.
This
emphasis
is
perfectly
understandable, especially in an agency called the Department of
Homeland Security, but you can see the problem it raises for
immigration advocates. In response to pressure for direly needed
reforms in immigration policy, the government reverts to kneejerk homeland security justifications, a justification that, even
when fallacious, is exceedingly difficult to overcome. For
example, there was an article just yesterday in a Pittsburgh
18 See, e.g., Marcia Coyle, "A Blast at Immigration Judges; Posner Sees a Lack of
Basic Skills," NAT'L L.J., p. 1 (Jan. 19, 2004) (citing Judge Posner's critique of BIA
decision he called "riven" with errors, consequences of 2002 streamlining procedures,
called "troubling reform"); Bill Myers, "Judges Losing Patience with Immigration Bench:
Experts," CHI. DAILY L. BULL., p. 1 (Sept. 3, 2004) (citing complaints of appellate judges
with BIA review, tracing situation back to 2002 DOJ order to streamline immigration
review).
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newspaper describing how USCIS errors in processing a world
famous Bulgarian opera singer's visa application caused her to
miss a production of Julius Caesar.19 The USCIS spokesman,
Christopher Bentley, responded to complaints with the following
comments:
We slowed the process down, we run through National
Security databases to ensure that that individual is entitled
to the service. We make no apologies for that; we need to
safeguard the homeland. Have we seen processing times
increase? Have we seen the backlog as a result of that? Yes.
National Security is paramount. We will do nothing to
20
jeopardize that in the name of speed.
That telling quote illustrates the challenge confronting us; all
immigration related policy arguments have to be framed in terms
of national security. That pervasive national security focus has
engendered what I would call an ambient impediment to
immigration advocacy, the agency's culture of "no".
Widespread reports of unfair, arbitrary and inconsistent
adjudications have reinforced the perception that adjudicators'
fail-safe position now is "no", notwithstanding the merits of an
individual application or petition. Further buttressing that view
is an overwhelming increase in the number of unnecessary
21
requests for additional evidence issued by USCIS adjudicators.
USCIS headquarters to its credit has tried to solve the problem,
but so far to no avail. The default position of adjudicators is that
they will not be the person who lets in the next Mohammed Atta.
22

While my comments, and those of others here, have
highlighted some of our immigration system's serious structural
flaws, the problems in our system run deeper still. We cannot
expect structural reforms to cure the ills of our system without
With
changing our failed immigration laws themselves.
19 See Marilynne Pitz, Spelling Mistake Sidelines Soprano; Miscue Adds Extra
Months to 6-Month Visa Approval Process, PITTSBURG POST-GAZETTE, Feb. 26, 2004, at Al
(describing how a misspelling cost a Bulagarian Soprano a chance to perform in the
Pittsburg Opera's production of "Julius Caesar").
20 See id. (responding to complaints about the process).
21 See generally Martin, supra note 11, at 1 (revealing that the USCIS often requests
evidence of good moral character).
22 See 9/11 COMMISSION REPORT: FINAL REPORT OF THE NATIONAL COMMISSION ON
TERRORIST ATTACKS UPON THE UNITED STATES 88 (2004) (Kean, Chr.) (calling Mohammed

Atta "operational ringleader of the 9/11 conspiracy").
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approximately nine million undocumented immigrants in the
United States,23 and CBP and ICE stretched thin in their efforts
to try to enforce the laws we have, it is clear to nearly everyone
that we need an overhaul of our immigration laws.
We need comprehensive reform that acknowledges the
economic, social, and geographic realities of migration patterns
from our southern border so that enforcement resources can be
trained on terrorists and criminals, not hard-working, tax-paying
individuals. We need reform that makes legality the norm and
enables the people who seek entry into this country for a shot at
the American dream to do so in a safe, legal, and orderly fashion.
We need reform that respects our heritage as a nation of
immigrants by embracing their initiative and their contributions
instead of treating them as outcasts and second-class citizens.
Until then, changes to the organizational structure of our
immigration agencies will produce little more than cosmetic
results.
Thank you very much.

23 See Sandra Dibble & Leonel Sanchez, Immigration Agenda Still Alive, Fox Says in
Baja, SAN DIEGO UNION-TRIB., Jun. 13, 2002, at Al (revealing that nearly half of the nine
million undocumented immigrants in the United states are Mexican).

